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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
JESUS A. JIMENEZ 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No: 20080892-CA 
POINT I 
RESPONDING TOTHE STATE'S POINT I, SENDING THE 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE TO THE JURY ON A FLAWED 
UNSUPPORTED THEORY IS ERROR. 
A. The trial court erred by sending an unsupported theory to the 
jury-
- 1 -
The State argues that, for a valid "independent basis" to exist to support a 
trial courts' decision, even if other alternative basis are fraught with infirmities, an 
appellate court need not address whether the trial court erred in considering the 
alternative basis. Br. Appellee at 12-14. 
In support of this position it cites State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, 95 
P.3d 1216, affd, 2005 UT 48, 122P.3d 571 ^20 (affirming a trial court's refusal to 
accept the plea bargain where sound grounds existed for the trial court's refusal in 
addition to those attacked); State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1998) at 12, 
13 (defendant failed to attack two of the four sentencing factors considered by the 
trial court, the unchallenged two of which were ostensibly valid); Andersen v. 
Professional Escrow Service, Inc., 118 P.3d 75 (Idaho 2005) (alternative grounds 
not assailed on appeal support motion to dismiss in a civil case); Greenwood v. 
Blackjack Cattle Co., 464 P.2d 281 (Kan. 1970) (When the trial court's decision is 
based on alternative grounds, appellants failure to challenge all grounds on appeal 
"renders unnecessary a decision on the issue that is raised"); San Antonio Press, 
Inc. v. Custom Built Machinery, 852 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.App. 1993) (unchallenged 
alternative grounds supported judgment.) The State then, in an effort apparently to 
cement the issue into place, cites 5 Am. Jur. 2nd Appellate Rev. §775 which stands 
for the proposition indicated ("where a separate and independent ground from the 
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one appeal supports the judgment made below, and is not challenged on appeal, the 
court must affirm.") See Br. Appellee at 12-13. 
The State's argument, while citing a correct statement of law insofar as it 
goes, is inapposite and improvidently focused. None of the cases cited, nor the 
encyclopedic reference, nor the cases cited in 5 Am. Jur. 2nd §775, support the 
proposition that the trial court does not err by submitting an erroneous theory to the 
jury for its consideration. The jury may well have arrived at a verdict of guilt 
based upon the erroneous alternative, regardless of what the trial judge may have 
had in mind. It is not the judge's verdict; it is the jury's decision which is in issue 
and that was dependent upon the trial court's submission on alternative theories. 
The State cites no authority for the proposition that it is permissible for a 
trial court to submit an erroneous alternative theory upon which the jury may 
convict a criminal defendant. The reason is that there is no such authority. Jury 
verdicts may not be impeached. Utah R. Evid. 606(b) prohibits "virtually all 
inquiries into the jury deliberation process." State v. Santana-Ruiz, 2007 UT 59, f 
33, 167 P.3d 1038. See also State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 4 (UT Ct. App. 
1993)(quoting Utah R. Evid. 606(b)). As there is no seer stone extant capable of 
determining which alternative, or what combination of the two, may have served to 
form the basis of the jury's verdict, the authorities cited by the State simply have 
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no application. 
The more acute question, which the State has inadvertently raised, is 
whether, given two alternative bases upon which to convict, one legally erroneous 
and unsupported, the other at least facially correct, the jury verdict can be 
supported. This dilemma was created by the decision of the trial court to submit 
both theories to the jury. This is hardly analogous to making an ultimate decision, 
e.g., dismissing a civil case, refusing a plea bargain, or sentencing a defendant 
where an appellant has cherry picked the questionable grounds and ignored the 
sound ones. 
The trial court's decision to submit both theories, one erroneous and 
unsupported, the other arguably correct, to the jury calls into question the 
unanimity of the jury's decision. See Article I, §10, Utah State Constitution. The 
judge was not the finder of fact and it was not his decision to convict given the two 
alternatives and the State's analysis is therefore unsound with respect to his 
decision to submit the two alternative theories. The question is, what theory did 
the jury rely upon? 
The defendant will not further elaborate on the issue of jury unanimity and 
its constitutional ramifications as it may affect this case. That issue is currently 
under consideration in a separate pending matter, State of Utah v. William Irvin 
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Reed, case number 20080570-CA. A decision in that case may affect the outcome 
of this appeal. Appellant argues simply that the "independent grounds" analysis 
advanced by the State is fatally flawed and the cases cited inapposite. 
B. The error was too plain and too obvious to survive invited error 
analysis. 
The circumstances of this case are too plain, manifest, and unexceptional for 
the trial court not to have corrected it. The crux of the problem is that the problem 
created (attempting to determine which of the alternatives formed the basis of the 
jury's verdict, and the unanimity thereof) is of constitutional dimension, as argued 
supra. Therefore, it must be found not to have been erroneous beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Reversal is required "if the error was prejudicial to the 
substantial rights of the party." State v. Tilalia, 2006 UT App. 474, % 9, 153 P.3d 
757. A conviction must be set aside if the record on the whole indicates that the 
constitutional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., citing 
Delewarev. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2nd 674 
(1986). 
Trial counsel's statement that the State need not show prior knowledge of 
the gun for submission to the jury (R. 149:8) could not have been part of a strategy. 
If it was, bluntly speaking, it was too ill considered for the court to have taken it 
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seriously and certainly doesn't rise to an acceptable level of professionalism. The 
trial court could not have seriously been led astray by counsel's off- hand comment 
that proof was not necessary. See Br. Appellant p. 19. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COUNSEL PERFORMED INEFFECTIVELY BY 
NOT ATTACKING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND FOR NOT 
MOVING TO DISMISS THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE. 
A. There was no reasonable strategy for counsel's failure to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to show Defendant's 
knowledge of the gun. 
The State's position regarding counsel's presumed strategy of failing to 
move to dismiss the aggravated robbery does not add up. The State's position is 
apparently as follows: 
Thus, counsel had a conceivable strategic reason for trying to get the 
robbery itself, and not just the aggravated robbery, thrown out. If 
Defendant did not know about the robbery, he could not have 
knowingly and intentionally participated in it and could not have been 
an accomplice. If he could not have been an accomplice, he could not 
have been guilty of even simple robbery and therefore could not have 
been guilty of felony murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. Where 
a conceivable strategic reason existed for counsel's not attacking the 
aggravating factor and for instead attacking the robbery itself, 
counsel's performance was not deficient. See Mahi, 2005UT App 494, 
120. 
Br. Appellee at 34. 
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Failure to attack the aggravated robbery on the basis of the 
defendant's knowledge of the gun simply allowed the jury another prong 
upon which to base a conviction. What possible benefit there could have 
been to allow the jury that opportunity is at best imagined. The State 
speculates that since there still remained an aggravated robbery based upon a 
robbery plus serious bodily injury, the jury would have convicted on the 
robbery count. Br. Appellee at 33. There is an unwarranted assumption. It 
may very well have been that the jury convicted on the basis of the gun 
alternative, ignoring the "serious bodily injury" element. Providing the jury 
another alternative, one which was unwarranted and erroneous, permitted the 
jury to convict upon an improper standard. 
The notion that counsel employed a reasonable strategy is unfounded. 
B. Counsel was deficient for not moving to dismiss where 
the issue was patently obvious irrespective of whether 
substantial precedent did or did not exist requiring a 
showing that Defendant knew that the principal had a gun. 
The State contends this was a "novel question." Br. Appellee at 34. It 
may be of first impression here, but it does not have the earmarks of novelty 
to it. If an enhanced conviction (aggravated robbery over simple robbery) 
can be had upon knowledge of a gun, and the defendant had no such 
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knowledge, that does not present a novel question, it is just common sense 
and patently obvious that counsel requests that a jury instruction reflect the 
requirement of such knowledge as well in addition to making a motion to 
dismiss. 
In any event, the defendant cited substantial existing authority to the 
effect that "scienter" is required for conviction as a principal for an offense 
involving an accomplice possessing or using a gun. See Br. Appellant Point 
I, passim. 
C. Counsel was deficient for not moving to 
dismiss because the evidence failed to demonstrate 
that Defendant knew a gun was being used. 
This point likewise has previously been analyzed. Br. Appellant Point /, 
passim. The State's position regarding some of the inferences drawn from the 
circumstances, which it advances as a basis for the defendant's knowledge that 
Mateo possessed a gun, are simply far-fetched, in defendant's view. The defendant 
drew all reasonable inferences from the facts and could divine no basis for such 
knowledge. Br. Appellant at 22-24. Trial counsel erred on this point and it was 
harmful. 
D. The Defendant complied with Rule 24(A)(9) Utah R. App. P. 
The State devotes considerable effort to the proposition that the defendant 
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